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ARTICLE 
GERMANY’S YESTERDAY IS CUBA’S TOMORROW: 
COMPARING THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIZATION TO 
THE CUBAN TRANSFORMATION  
Kayla M. Bramnick† 
ABSTRACT 
For the last fifty years, the effects of communism have taken their toll on the 
island of Cuba. The United States responded aggressively to the communist 
takeover by severing its relationship with and sanctioning Cuba. These 
sanctions have failed their purpose of punishing the communist regime for 
violating fundamental human rights. Instead, the sanctions have further 
harmed Cuban nationals. The United States has a responsibility to lift the 
embargo and allow travel and communication between the nationals in Cuba 
and the exiles in America. Only when the Cuban nationals understand the 
benefits of a free society and have the support of the free world will they be able 
to stand up to the communist regime.  
The process of democratization is a difficult one. Many European nations 
have transitioned from communistic and socialistic systems to democracy. 
Germany was a nation that experienced this transition. Germany’s experience, 
however, was unique because half of the nation had already established a stable 
democracy. West Germany was able to assist East Germany’s transition from 
communism into a democratic state. Germany’s successes and failures provide 
an excellent case study and comparison for Cuba’s democratization.  
In December of 2014, President Obama declared a policy change focused on 
building a new relationship with Cuba. These endeavors may prove to be 
successful if they are gradually implemented. The United States would be 
prudent to follow the German model and provide Cuban Americans with the 
opportunity to assist their Cuban relatives in the quest for a free Cuba.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Samuel Adams once opined, ‘‘Among the natural rights of the Colonists 
are these: First, a right to life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; 
together with the right to support and defend them in the best manner they 
can.’’1 In the United States, some authors take the position that the right to 
property is a fundamental human right.2 Enemies of freedom, however, 
gravitate towards an oppressive ideology. One such ideology is communism. 
‘‘[T]he theory of Communism may be summed up in one sentence: Abolish 
all private property.’’3 The concept of property ownership is one of the most 
fundamental issues in a political system. Governments rely on either one of 
these two ideologies to either protect or deny their citizens these rights. A 
government that expropriates the right to own property violates the 
fundamental human rights of its citizens. 
A certain mystique surrounds nations that abstain from developing 
alongside progressing nations. Oftentimes, nations are unable to advance 
culturally, technologically, or economically as a result of an oppressive 
ideology. The Republic of Cuba is an example of a state that has been at a 
cultural standstill since 1940 when communism encroached upon the Island. 
Communist leaders denied citizens’ rights, including the right to own private 
property. The Communist Party swiftly incapacitated Cubans’ attempts to 
regain their freedom. Insurgents, as they were called, were promptly arrested, 
tortured, and executed for daring to oppose the party line.4 The Islanders’ 
frustration with their immovable situation led to a mass exodus of Cubans 
and a pandemic of discouragement and passivity amongst the Cubans who 
could not escape.5 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. SAMUEL ADAMS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS (1772), 
https://history.hanover.edu/texts/adamss.html. 
 2. Stuart Grider, A Proposal for the Marketization of Housing in Cuba: The Limited 
Equity Housing Corporation ----- A New Form of Property, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 453, 
479 (1996) (noting that the concept that the right to private property is a fundamental right is 
‘‘evidenced by the implementation of restitution and compensation schemes in post-socialist 
Eastern Europe and a 1974 position of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees’’ 
with regards to property expropriated in Uganda). Notably, Grider disagrees with the 
proposition.  
 3. KARL MARX & FRIEDERICH ENGELS, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 23 (Paul M. Sweezy trans., 
1948). 
 4. Organización de Los Estados Americanos, Informe Sobre La Situacion De Los 
Derechos Humanos En Cuba, COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS (April 7, 
1967), http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Cuba67sp/indice.htm. 
 5. Cubans who left Cuba at the beginning of Castro’s era will hereinafter be referred to 
as ‘‘exiles’’ and Cubans who stayed in Cuba will hereinafter be referred to as ‘‘nationals.’’ 
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A government only possesses the power granted to it by its citizens. When 
a government breaks its promises or takes action that harms the public, the 
people begin to doubt its legitimacy. In the early 1980s, President Reagan 
announced a policy towards communist and socialist nations known as the 
Reagan Doctrine. Under the Reagan Doctrine, if a nation’s people viewed 
their government as illegitimate, then the United States conferred upon itself 
a right to intervene on behalf of that nation’s people.6 The United States’ 
aggressive reaction to Castro’s takeover in many ways foreshadowed this 
doctrine. 
Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 
otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act.7 The Act proscribed trade, 
communication, and travel between Cuba and the United States. These 
embargos were not limited to the relationship between the United States and 
Cuba, but rather extended to the entire international community.8 The 
consequences of this Act were swift and concentrated on the Cuban people 
rather than the Communist Party.9 As per the Act’s language, the United 
States refused to lift these bans unless Cuba became a democracy.10 However, 
the current social and economic status of Cuban nationals prevents them 
from pressuring their government to change. The Cuban problem has 
become a circular one and requires a different approach. 
Eastern European countries have experience in evolving from oppressive 
regimes to democratic methodologies. As a result of the fall of communism 
and socialism in European countries, ‘‘the term ‘nationalization’ came to 
stand for imprisonment: the suspension of national history, severance from 
the world, poverty, loss of identity, and colonization . . . .’’11 Numerous 
European nations embraced the Western view of freedom for all, which 
includes, inter alia, the right to private property.12 Embracing private 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. The ‘‘Reagan Doctrine’’ Is Announced, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/the-reagan-doctrine-is-announced. 
 7. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 
[hereinafter ‘‘Helms-Burton Act’’]. 
 8. Id. at § 6032. 
 9. Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 575, 595 (1997). 
 10. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.C.S. § 6022(1), (4). 
 11. Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A 
Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 315, 370 (1993). 
 12. Jon Mills & Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Whither Communism: A Comparative Perspective 
on Constitutionalism in a Postsocialist Cuba, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1219, 1234 (2009). 
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property rights is a fundamental tenet for any fledgling economy.13 The 
various Eastern European transitions furnish a multitude of rich case studies 
that provide guidance for a post-communist Cuba.14 Germany successfully 
transitioned15 from a controlled economy to a free-market society.16 This 
Article examines the potential Cuban response to its current governmental 
failure and to its potential democratization by analyzing the East German 
response as it transitioned to democracy. This Article will also analyze the 
various processes Cuba may utilize to restore expropriated property to its 
citizens. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Cuba 
In the early 1800s, Cuba was under the ruthless control of Spanish 
colonials.17 In 1868, the Cuban people united against the Spaniards and 
drafted the Cuban Declaration of Independence.18 In this document, the 
emerging leadership ‘‘recognized the natural rights of all peoples and viewed 
slavery as incompatible with this principle.’’19 
The United States supported Cuba’s attempts for independence, and 
freedom was attained in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War.20 
Spain signed the Treaty of Paris relinquishing the Island to the United States. 
For the next three years, the United States played an active role in molding 
                                                                                                                                      
 13. See Robert E. Freer, Jr., The Significance of Restitution in the Economic Recovery of 
Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 185, 188 (1995). 
 14. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1234. 
 15. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘‘transition’’ will refer to Cuba’s future 
democratization from communism.  
 16. Heather M. Stack, The ‘‘Colonization’’ of East Germany?: A Comparative Analysis of 
German Privatization, 46 DUKE L.J. 1211, 1212 (1997); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Stephan M. 
Bleisteiner, Some Lessons for Cuba from the Legal Changes in Eastern Europe, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. 
INT’L L. 173, 178 (1995). Other nations that successfully transitioned from communism 
include Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Id.  
 17. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1223. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. FLORIDA CENTER FOR INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY, Spanish-American War for Cuba’s 
Independence, EXPLORING FLORIDA (2002), http://fcit.usf.edu/florida/lessons/s-a_war/s-
a_war1.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). ‘‘The United States declared war on Spain after a U.S. 
warship exploded and sank on February 15, 1898. The Spanish-American war ended when 
Spain signed a treaty giving the United States control over Cuba [and other Caribbean 
islands].’’ Id. 
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Cuba’s future.21 In 1901, Cuba enacted its first constitution.22 The 
Constitución de la Republica de Cuba recognized the right to property as 
fundamental.23 Article 32 of the Cuban Constitution mandated that ‘‘no 
person could be deprived of property without a valid public purpose and due 
compensation.’’24 On May 20, 1902, Cuba declared its sole sovereignty and 
separation from the United States.25 In spite of Cuba’s claim to sovereignty, 
however, the United States retained the right to intervene on Cuba’s behalf 
in order to preserve its newfound independence.26   
1. The Batista dictatorship  
During the next forty years, Cuba failed to achieve a free democracy. 
Disputed elections in 1906 and 1924, as well as the United States’ constant 
intervention, caused several revolts.27 In September 1933, Fulgencia Batista 
led a revolt, overthrowing the fledgling democracy. In 1940, Cuban 
legislators adopted a new constitution.28 The legislators of this revised 
constitution confirmed the original idea of owning property as a natural 
right.29 The legislators ratified Article 24, which stated that a government 
taking of private property would have to be for just cause and required that 
any individual whose property was taken by the government be 
compensated.30 This constitution was ‘‘a model for many Latin American 
constitutions,’’ because it also ‘‘guaranteed the rights to employment and 
collective bargaining and established a minimum wage, maximum work 
                                                                                                                                      
 21. Id. 
 22. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA 
[CONSTITUTION] Feb. 21, 1901, translated in British and Foreign State Papers 1900-1901, at 
554 (Augustus H. Oakes & Willoughby Maycock eds., 1904). 
 23. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224. ‘‘All countries in Eastern Europe have 
acknowledged the fundamental right of private entities, domestic and foreign, to own property 
and they have provided legal protection to private property rights.’’ Travieso-Diaz & 
Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 187. 
 24. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224. 
 25. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 580. 
 26. Id. 
 27. SERGIO DIAZ-BRIQUETS & JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, CORRUPTION IN CUBA: CASTRO AND 
BEYOND 63 (University of Texas Press 2006). 
 28. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224-25. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE 
CUBA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 21, 1901, arts. 24, 87, translated in 1 Constitutions of Nations 610, 
614, 626 (Amos J. Peaslee ed., 2d ed. 1956). 
 29. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1224-25. 
 30. Id. 
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week, [and] maternity leave . . . .’’31 The Constitution of 1940 is commonly 
viewed by Cuban exiles as ‘‘the last legitimate expression of the constitutional 
will of the Cuban people . . . .’’32  
During this tumultuous time, Batista, a formidable figure, governed the 
Island. His first ‘‘term’’ in office was properly procured through a democratic 
vote.33 After the end of his term, Batista continued to dominate Cuban 
politics for the next twenty-five years by controlling the presidents 
throughout that time.34 In 1952, however, Batista staged a coup, repealed the 
1940 constitution, and illegally enthroned himself as Cuba’s dictator.35 
Batista’s regime was corrupt.36 Bribery was the method by which Cubans 
accomplished anything.37 Poverty was a major problem and the middle class 
was kept small as a result of vast unemployment.38 The restrictions of 
freedoms and the declining economy provoked frustration among the 
people. 
2. Castro’s Communism 
a. Fidel Castro: The Communist Dictator 
In 1959, a young Fidel Castro led the people’s revolt against Batista’s 
dictatorship.39 Castro promised freedom and equal opportunities for all and 
successfully overturned Batista’s governance.40 Castro’s administration 
enacted the Fundamental Law in the same year.41 This law reestablished 
Article 24 from the 1940 Constitution, thus affirming the government’s 
commitment to private property.42 In contravention of the promises of 
                                                                                                                                      
 31. Grider, supra note 2, at 480-81. 
 32. Daniel A. Espino, Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal for an Equitable Resolution to 
Confiscated Cuban Property, 32 NOVA L. REV. 423, 429 (2008) (citation omitted). 
 33. Steven E. Hendrix, Tensions in Cuban Property Law, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1996). 
 34. Jerry A. Sierra, Batista, HISTORYOFCUBA.COM, 
http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/batista.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).  
 35. Interview with Carlos Feldman, Cuban Exile, in Miami, Florida (Dec. 21, 2014). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. José Patiño Girona, After 50 years, Cuban Expats Recall Broken Promises Of Castro, 
THE TAMPA TRIBUNE (May 22, 2013, 1:23 PM), 
http://tbo.com/special_section/history/2008/dec/26/after-50-years-cuban-expatriates-recall-
broken-pro-ar-111594/. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1226.  
 42. Id. 
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freedom, the bigger-than-life dictator launched a fifty-year reign of economic 
devastation.43 Due to his Marxist/Leninist political ideology, Fidel established 
an agenda for nationalization of all private property.44 In July of 1960, Fidel 
seized all United States property and Cuban businesses.45 Three months later, 
the Urban Reform Law ‘‘eliminated private sale and rental of homes, 
transferred property to homeless Cuban citizens, canceled mortgages, and 
made all rent and mortgage payments payable to the state.’’46 Cuban law 
developed double standards with regards to small businesses.47 Individuals 
were restricted from forming corporations, although they were allowed to 
operate certain small enterprises.48 Additionally, Cubans were allowed to sell 
their houses or cars to other Cubans, but ‘‘local bank loans [were] limited.’’49 
The only way to succeed in Cuba was to have connections with Castro’s 
administration.50  
As a result of the turmoil, some Cubans began to seek refuge in the United 
States while others attempted in vain to depose his government. Cuban exiles 
endeavored to defeat Fidel in the Bay of Pigs invasion.51 The exiles, however, 
failed miserably. While some exiles escaped, the rest were either killed or 
captured by Castro’s forces.52 The regime responded to these acts of rebellion 
by ‘‘systematically depriv[ing the people] of their fundamental rights to free 
expression, privacy, association, assembly, movement and due process of 
                                                                                                                                      
 43. Girona, supra note 39. 
 44. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1232. ‘‘The first nationalizations targeted the 
property of former officials in the Batista regime.’’ Id. at 1231-32. However, the subsequent 
waves of nationalizations were targeted towards private citizens. Id. at 1232. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Espino, supra note 32, at 430.  
 47. See generally Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1232-33. This was largely focused on 
the Cuban agriculture industry. 
 48. Id. at 1232 n.84.  
 49. Id.; Cuba’s Legal Composite A Blend of the Familiar and the Foreign, BENCH & B. 
MINN., (Jan. 11, 2012), http://mnbenchbar.com/2012/01/cubas-legal-composite/. 
 50. Interview with Carlos Feldman, supra note 35, at 1. 
 51. Bay of Pigs Invasion, HISTORY CHANNEL (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/cold-
war/bay-of-pigs-invasion (last visited Nov. 21, 2015). After Fidel Castro took over, ‘‘officials 
at the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attempted to push 
Castro from power . . . . [I]n April 1961, the CIA launched . . . a full-scale invasion of Cuba by 
sending 1,400 American-trained Cubans who had fled their homes when Castro took over.’’ 
Id. Nevertheless, the invasion was not successful because ‘‘[t]he invaders were badly 
outnumbered by Castro’s troops, and they surrendered after less than 24 hours of fighting.’’ 
Id. 
 52. Id. 
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law.’’53 Cuban nationals who rebelled were detained, imprisoned, tortured, 
and executed.54   
Fidel used tactics such as police warnings, surveillance, and ‘‘politically 
motivated dismissals from employment’’ to coerce obedience.55 Speech was 
limited to government propaganda. The regime used constant surveillance to 
inhibit any dissent from the government.56 Mobile phones and computers 
were off limits to the average person. Television and radio programs were 
strictly monitored in order to promote the government’s message among the 
people. Insurgents were either imprisoned or murdered.57 Journalists were 
arrested because of their ‘‘work activities’’ in Cuba.58 Since 1990, minimum 
wage has dropped to the equivalent of three dollars per month and 
productivity has dropped forty-five percent.59 
In keeping with the socialistic ideology, Castro’s administration provided 
a variety of social entitlements to his people.60 These included free health care, 
day care for children, public education, low priced but strictly portioned food 
and clothing, low-cost housing and transportation, and free or low-cost 
access to sports and recreation.61 Such entitlements created a dispirited 
society that passively permitted the abuse of governmental power.62  
b. The Global Response  
The international backlash to Fidel’s takeover of Cuba was swift and 
jarring. The United States severed its diplomatic relations with Cuba.63 
Cuba’s dependence on the Soviet Union dissolved when Russia suffered its 
                                                                                                                                      
 53. Cuba: Fidel Castro’s Abusive Machinery Remains Intact, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 
18. 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/02/18/cuba-fidel-castro-s-abusive-machinery-
remains-intact. 
 54. See Organización de Los Estados Americanos, supra note 4. 
 55. Cuba: Fidel Castro’s Abusive Machinery Remains Intact, supra note 53. 
 56. Grider, supra note 2, at 461. 
 57. See Organización de los Estados Americanos, supra note 4. 
 58. Cuba’s Legal Composite A Blend of the Familiar and the Foreign, supra note 49. 
 59. John P. Sweeney, Why the Cuban Trade Embargo Should be Maintained, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (Nov. 10, 1994), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1994/11/bg1010nbsp-
why-the-cuban-trade. 
 60. See Profile: Raul Castro, BBC WORLD NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12700491. Raúl observed that, ‘‘[m]any 
Cubans confuse socialism with freebies and subsidies, and equality with egalitarianism.’’ Id.  
 61. Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 187 n.20. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Grider, supra note 2, at 462. 
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own economic collapse.64 By mid-1993, the Cuban economy suffered such a 
deep depression that Cubans were restricted to eating one and one-half to 
two meals a day.65 In 1996, a Cuban military aircraft shot down two unarmed 
United States civilian aircraft, resulting in the deaths of three United States 
citizens and one permanent resident.66 The United States responded by 
codifying a trade embargo against Cuba.67  
 (1) The Reagan Doctrine: The United States’ Right to Intervene  
One of the dangers facing a transitioning nation occurs when the 
government faces questions of legitimacy from its citizens.68 Former 
President Reagan supported the notion that the United States should be able 
to provide economic and military support to rebels combating undemocratic 
governments.69 The Reagan Doctrine contended that defining a legitimate 
government ‘‘depends on the consent of the governed’’ and on its respect for 
the rights of citizens.70 The purpose of the United States’ aggressiveness was 
to show that communism was not invincible.71 Reagan’s goal was to ‘‘shatter 
the Marxist-Leninist myth of the irreversibility of proletarian revolution by 
helping anti-communist forces challenge the legitimacy of the totalitarian 
regimes.’’72 According to the Reagan Doctrine, legitimacy is the foremost 
predictor of the success of a nation’s constitution-making process.73 While a 
nation-state may have characteristics of illegitimacy, it is not officially 
deemed so until that nation’s people doubt its legitimacy. ‘‘[T]he people of a 
country might perceive the policies of a government, the government itself, 
or even the entire state as illegitimate.’’74 
                                                                                                                                      
 64. See Dhooge, supra note 9, at 587. 
 65. Grider, supra note 2, at 463-64.  
 66. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 575. 
 67. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (1996). 
 68. See generally Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy Revisited: ‘Pro-Democratic’ 
Armed Intervention in the Post-Bipolar World, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 481, 486 
(1993). 
 69. David P. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought; the Use of Force in the Reagan Years, 11 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 45, 105 (1994). 
 70. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and 
International Law, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 19, 20-21 
(Council on Foreign Relations ed., 2d ed. 1991). 
 71. Robert Tucker, Reagan’s Foreign Policy, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 13-14 (1989); see generally 
JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, LEGITIMACY AND FORCE 391-93 (Transaction Books 1989). 
 72. Fidler, supra note 69, at 105. 
 73. Roth, supra note 68, at 486; see also Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1236. 
 74. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1236. 
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The communist parties of European nations such as Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, and Hungary lost a level of legitimacy in the 
eyes of their people.75 Demonstrations were held on the streets of Warsaw, 
Riga, Prague, and Budapest as a result of the public’s revulsion towards 
government control of the constitution-drafting processes.76 The Reagan 
Doctrine provided the United States with various avenues for opposing 
illegitimate regimes. It permitted the United States to sanction governments 
that lacked ‘‘consent of the governed and depended on external supplies of 
armaments to maintain themselves in power.’’77   
Cuban citizens struggled with skepticism towards both the Communist 
Party and the Island’s oppressive government. Cubans never doubted the 
legitimacy of their state because ‘‘the Cuban revolution was not imposed by 
a foreign power; rather . . . [by] a phenomenon primarily conducted by 
Cubans.’’78 Cuban exiles view Castro’s Communist Party with great 
skepticism.79 This is similar to the skepticism experienced by citizens of 
Germany.80 Castro’s communism was an ‘‘organic’’ public movement that 
began as a result of Cubans’ frustration with Batista’s dictatorship. Although 
Cuba recognized at least fifty opposition groups in the early 1990s, ‘‘political 
                                                                                                                                      
 75. See id.; Michael L. Neff, Eastern Europe’s Policy of Restitution of Property in the 1990s, 
10 DICK. J. INT’L L. 357 (1992).  
 76. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1236. 
 77. Roth, supra note 68, at 485 (emphasis omitted).  
 78. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1256. Latvia’s people doubted the legitimacy of 
their state when, at the end of World War II, Latvia was subjected to the terror of socialism. 
Mass demonstrations became commonplace and the Soviet regime refused to respond. Id. at 
1240. ‘‘[T]he illegitimacy of the state became the constitution drafter’s biggest opportunity: 
establishing a distinct identity of an independent Latvia and, through that, political 
legitimacy.’’ Id.  
 79. See Interview with Rigoberto Sotolongo, Cuban Exile, in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 21, 2014). 
 80. See John Feffer, The Costs of German Reunification, THE WORLD POST (Nov. 12, 2014), http: 
//www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/the-costs-of-german-reuni_b_6144764.html. Skepticism 
towards a socialist party was also present in parts of Europe such as Czechoslovakia. Mills & 
Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1245-46.  In 1948, Czechoslovakia’s democratic government was 
superseded by a Stalinized system. Id. When the nation nationalized of property, a ‘‘cathartic 
revulsion’’ was triggered and the citizens perceived the Communist Party as illegitimate. Id. The 
people mobilized protests against the government believing that a new constitution would restore 
their rights. Id. at 1249.  Eventually the Communistic government surrendered to the will of the 
people. Id. at 1247-48. Unlike the people of Czechoslovakia, the people of Poland perceived the 
Communist Party’s role in the state as illegitimate. Id. at 1241. Poland allowed other political parties 
to be legally established even though the elections were rigged to ‘‘maintain[] . . . political 
supremacy.’’ Id. at 1244. After various protests the government finally implemented political 
reforms of ‘‘pluralism and capitalism usher[ing] Polish communism into the chronicles of history 
with a stroke of a pen.’’ Id. at 1244. 
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activity outside officially-sanctioned channels has met consistent and fierce 
repression, including harassment, arrest, imprisonment, torture, executions, 
and targeted assassinations.’’81 
 (2) Helms-Burton Act:  The United States Response to Cuba  
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act into law.82 
The purpose of the Act was to strengthen sanctions against Fidel’s regime, to 
support the initiation of a democratic process on the Island, to protect the 
United States from acts of Cuban terrorism, and to protect United States 
nationals from confiscation of property by the Castro administration.83 The 
Act, in essence, prevents the United States, or its allies, from fostering 
relationships with Cuba until its government meets certain criteria. The 
language of the Helms-Burton Act demands that Cuba must begin accepting 
democratic policies, evidenced by a transitional government, before the 
United States will restore its relationship with the Island.  
The combination of the United States embargo, the termination of 
subsidies from Russia, and the sharp decline in export trade as a result of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union severely affected the Cuban economy.84 ‘‘Cuban 
nationals were asked to leave their manufacturing and office jobs to 
                                                                                                                                      
 81. Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12, at 1258. In 1995, the Concilio Cubano (Cuban 
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 82. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 575. This statute was named after the two legislators who 
introduced it, United States Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina) and United 
States Representative Dan Burton (Republican, Indiana).  
 83. Id. at 576. 
 84. See generally Mills & Koslosky, supra note 12. 
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‘volunteer’ in the fields.’’85 Unemployment rapidly became customary and 
rationing was introduced for such commodities and services as food, fuel, 
and electricity.86 Droves of Cubans immigrated to the United States and other 
nations to escape the corruption and injustice. For many unable to escape, 
life under Communism was unbearable, evidenced by the fact that ‘‘Cuba has 
one of the highest suicide rates in the Americas.’’87 
c. Raúl Castro: The Brother of the Dictator 
In 2006, after forty-seven years of uninterrupted governance, Fidel 
underwent surgery and temporarily delegated his authority to his brother 
Raúl.88 Two years later, Fidel resigned from office as President of the Council 
of State and Commander in Chief of Cuba.89 In 2011, Fidel resigned all of his 
state and political positions and never attempted to regain power.90 In the 
same year, Cuba’s Communist Party elected Raúl to succeed Fidel as head of 
the country’s highest political body and only legal party.91 Raúl introduced 
several significant changes.92 He ‘‘allowed unused state-owned land to pass 
over to private farmers and cooperatives in an attempt to boost domestic food 
production.’’93 The effects of these changes were evidenced in the distinct rise 
in salaries and state pensions.94 
Further, Raúl expressed the concern that ‘‘[m]any Cubans confuse 
socialism with freebies and subsidies, and equality with egalitarianism.’’95 In 
2010, the administration began to reassess the Island’s governmental 
structure and considered moving towards a model that allows for private 
commerce.96 A component of this process included the government’s plan to 
‘‘reduce the size of the state.’’97 Unfortunately, Raúl has not been able to 
                                                                                                                                      
 85. Grider, supra note 2, at 463-64. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Andres Oppenheimer, After 50 Years, Cuba Has Little To Show, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 
12, 2008), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-
oppenheimer/article1930846.html. 
 88. Raul Castro Fast Facts, CNN WORLD NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/13/world/americas/raul-castro---fast-facts/. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Profile: Raul Castro, supra note 60. 
 93. Id. Recently, Raúl also relaxed restrictions to own mobile phones and computers. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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substantially advance these objectives because the economy has steadily and 
substantially declined. 
In comparison with people of other Latin American countries, Cubans 
have a low per capita income. ‘‘[Cubans] have fewer television sets, 
telephones, computers and cars relative to their population than most Latin 
American countries, and the lowest percentage of people with access to the 
Internet in the region, even below Haiti.’’98 The U.N. Human Development 
Report ‘‘lists the island’s per capita income at $6,000 a year.’’99 Cuba’s current 
gross domestic product (‘‘GDP’’) is somewhere between Haiti’s and 
Nicaragua’s.100 ‘‘1.8 million pensioners [received] an average of $10 a month, 
equal to about three percent of the GDP.’’101 Currently, Cuba’s trade deficit 
stands in excess of one and one half billion dollars annually.102 
As a result of the Island’s recent economic downfall, the government has 
truncated the entitlements originally promised to the Cuban nationals.103 
Additionally, the Island has been unable to service its thirteen billion dollar 
debt to Western creditors.104 
In the midst of the despair and darkness, there is a glimmer of hope for 
the Cuban people.  In April 2011, Raúl Castro opened the Communist Party 
congress with a declaration that ‘‘leaders should be limited to two five-year 
terms in office.’’105 Two years later, in February 2013, Raúl was re-elected to 
a second five-year term.106 Later, ‘‘[d]uring a nationally televised speech, 
Castro announce[d] that he will step down from power in 2018 when his term 
is over.’’107 Commentators on Raúl’s shocking speech mentioned that he 
‘‘hinted at other changes to the constitution, some so dramatic that they will 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. Oppenheimer, supra note 87. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Grider, supra note 2, at 462-63. The real per capita GDP of Cuba is only $2,000 per 
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 102. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 588. 
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have to be ratified by the Cuban people in a referendum.’’108 ‘‘The inevitable 
end to Cuban caudillismo109 . . . and a corresponding change in Cuba’s 
international political and economic relations may usher in a new era of 
Cuban constitutionalism.’’110 Cuba’s relationship with the United States 
continues to be precarious.111 Until recently, the United States government 
refused to engage with the Cuban government under the leadership of Fidel 
or Raúl Castro.112 As for the people’s legitimacy crisis, analysts await Raúl’s 
response.113 The Cuban government has permitted neither a dissenting group 
to form nor a strong civil society to coalesce, independent from the state or 
the party.114 Most likely, the Cuban government has proscribed opposition 
movements because otherwise a new constitutional system would have to be 
developed.115 
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 115. A healthy internal opposition will encourage private ownership, domestic 
entrepreneurship, and foreign investment.  
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3. Is the Cuban Culture Worth Saving? 
The poet T.S. Eliot once described culture as ‘‘that which makes life worth 
living.’’116 The Cuban culture is no exception. Cuban culture is rich with 
history, diversity, and luscious traditions, from the distinct salsa music to the 
delicious Hispanic cuisine. Cubans are a conglomeration of individuals from 
Spanish, African, French, Asian, and Jewish cultures and are known for their 
lively and excitable personalities.117 Education and hard work have always 
been critical aspects of the Cuban lifestyle. Cubans who have immigrated to 
the United States have experienced success and security as a result of their 
work ethic. Economically, Cubans enjoy greater security than other Hispanic 
groups in the United States.118   
Currently, Cuban Americans play an influential role in American culture, 
especially in the political sphere.119 One reason for the fierce level of political 
engagement is that many former members of the Cuban government 
immigrated to the United States.120 Another reason Cubans participate 
heavily in American politics is because they understand that ‘‘politics is a 
tangible thing that has real and deep consequences.’’121 ‘‘The driving 
ideological force behind most Cuban American political activity has been 
opposition to the Marxist regime in Cuba.’’122 In 1990, seventy-eight percent 
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of Cuban Americans were registered to vote. Studies show that Cubans 
overwhelmingly vote for the Republican Party as a result of their conservative 
views.123 Cubans recognize that the United States plays a pivotal role in 
Cuba’s prospective democratization. In addition to the political involvement, 
Cubans have made distinct contributions to the fields of academia, medicine, 
business, science, arts, sports, and music. 
Unlike cultures that encourage independence or private personalities, 
Cubans have a reputation for being lively and boisterous.124 It is customary 
to spot Cubans socializing around the domino table, smoking cigars, 
drinking Cuban coffee, and discussing politics.125 Freedom is an essential 
element of the Cuban way of life. Thus, when the people lost their rights to 
life and property they felt compelled to leave their beloved homeland.126 As a 
result of the forced exodus, there is a widespread desire, among the exiles, for 
the opportunity to return and recreate a free Cuba.127 However, these same 
individuals refuse to return until the government makes some permanent 
changes. Rigoberto Sotolongo and his son José escaped from Cuba twenty-
two years ago solely to procure the freedom and opportunities they could 
never receive under Castro’s communism.128 Both men disclosed that they 
would not return to their homeland until the ‘‘current corrupt government . 
. . [is] removed’’ and democracy is established.129 
                                                                                                                                      
 123.  Id.  
 124. Rita de Zayas, The Origin of Dominoes and its Introduction in Cuba, CUBA HERITAGE 
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B. Germany  
1. The Hitler Era  
Like Cuba, Germany also endeavored to establish a free government but 
faced overwhelming barriers. In the 1920s, Germany was a republic.130 
However, by 1932 the German Nazi party controlled Germany’s 
parliament.131 One year later, Adolph Hitler was appointed as Chancellor of 
the nation.132 Like Castro’s regime, Hitler introduced a reign of unbridled 
control and eventual terror. 
Hitler began his reign of terror by enacting laws that effectively stripped 
rights from certain groups of people.133 Like in Cuba, the Nazis began by 
expropriating Jewish businesses.134 Jewish people were stripped of all 
property rights.135 Eventually, this injustice led to the ‘‘Wannsee 
Conference.’’136 High-ranking Nazi leaders and German government officials 
met to discuss and formulate policies to answer the ‘‘Jewish Question.’’137 The 
Nazis coined their answer to this question as the ‘‘Final Solution.’’138 The 
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implementation of this ‘‘solution’’ resulted in the massacre of millions of 
innocent men, women, and children.139  
The fact that the government and the nation were driven by an immoral 
creed does not automatically suggest that the Nazi regime was illegitimate.140 
At that point in time, German citizens were desperate to follow someone who 
would promote change. They believed in Adolph Hitler; they believed in the 
Nazi doctrine and were willing to follow his lead.141 While the western world 
was shocked at the consequences of a nation led by Nazism, the Germans, as 
a whole, trusted their leader and his ideas. They did not view Nazism as 
illegitimate or doubt Hitler’s authority.142 
2. Life After Hitler 
Nazism reigned in Germany until May 1945, when German armed forces 
were compelled to surrender.143 The nation was partitioned into four military 
occupation zones.144 The United States, France, and the United Kingdom 
controlled the western zones, and the Soviet Union had jurisdiction over the 
eastern zone.145 By 1949, the western zones merged to form the Federal 
Republic of Germany (‘‘West Germany’’).146 The eastern zone became the 
German Democratic Republic (‘‘East Germany’’).147 The division between the 
people of West and East Germany was similar to the division between the 
Cuban exiles and nationals. Like the Cuban exiles in the United States, West 
Germany fully embraced the democratic system of its benefactor nations.148 
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Conversely, similarly to the Cuban nationals, East Germany followed a 
trajectory leading the nation from Nazi fascism to Russian communism.149   
a. The Communization of East Germany 
In 1952, East Germany passed a law providing for the dispossession of 
property for alleged misdemeanors and felonies.150 Eventually, that law 
transmogrified into ‘‘the transformation of private property into socialist 
property of a cooperative in which the original holders held nothing more 
than titular ownership.’’151 This transmogrification was based on the ideology 
that property was best preserved for the collective good.152 This same ideology 
has perpetuated Cuban life throughout the Castro regime.  
As the concept of private property is non-existent under a communist 
ideology, Communism had a devastating effect on East Germany. ‘‘Life under 
a communist system changed the East Germans. . . . [as] they lived under a 
different set of laws, with a different social system, a pattern of political 
oppression, a struggling economy, and a low standard of living.’’153 
Unemployment soared and restitution of property claims plummeted.154 East 
Germans experienced a violation of a fundamental right, as they could not 
own property. East Germany’s economic downturn, as a result of 
communism, resembled Cuba’s experience. The East Germans’ frustration 
with the economic stress and infringement of liberties led to the eventual 
crumbling of the regime along with the Berlin Wall in 1989 when the two 
nations were unified.155 However, forty-five years of separation vastly 
changed the personalities of the two nations, and this caused conflicts 
between the two identities.156  
b. The Democratization of the Re-Unified Germany 
The treaties binding West and East Germany established a democratic 
form of government.157 The ‘‘marriage’’ between these two nations protected 
the newly formed nation from serious danger to its democracy and 
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economy.158 ‘‘East Germany had the unique advantage of [merging] with [its] 
western counterpart’’ which could support its transition from communism 
to democracy, unlike other countries in Eastern Europe.159 West Germany 
had already developed a strong market economy, a robust democratic 
government, a solid relationship with the Western world, and still had a 
history, personality, and culture identical to that of East Germany. Nations 
such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Latvia transitioned from socialism to a 
democratic state without that support.160 Similarly, Cuba has the opportunity 
to follow Germany’s lead since a large percentage of Cubans currently live in 
a democratic society. Instead of two nations merging, Cuban exiles could be 
allowed to return to the Island, and they would be in a position to assist the 
Cuban nationals in transitioning from communism to democracy. 
Unfortunately, even years after the reunification, a ‘‘deep economic and 
emotional divide between east and west’’ remained.161 East Germans 
struggled to trust the representative process that was so quickly thrust upon 
them.162 ‘‘[T]he reunification . . . was an absorption of East Germany into the 
West German system, rather than a marriage of two equal states.’’163 The 
reunified government left East Germans feeling ‘‘uninformed . . . and 
uninvolved in their new economy.’’164 Furthermore, the East Germans’ lack 
of ownership in privatized enterprises encouraged uncertainty and mistrust 
toward the new government.165 Dissension concerning the ‘‘foreign’’ western 
government prompted East Germans to perceive the new government system 
to be illegitimate.166 
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As part of the reunification process, all East German courts were shut down, 
and the ‘‘West German system of specialized courts’’ superseded them.167 West 
German judges presided instead of East German judges.168 The rationale behind 
this decision was that the East Germans simply did not know West German law 
and procedure. The prevalence of West German judges was only supposed to 
be provisional, but instead ‘‘[m]any East Berliners . . . began to feel that they 
were being ‘colonized by the West . . . .’’’169  
Cultural values greatly differed between the two people. ‘‘East Germans 
have witnessed Western prosperity and are generally unsatisfied with their 
relative situation.’’170 They viewed West Germans as ‘‘foreigners within[,]’’ 
and ‘‘feelings of animosity . . . have grown and a certain East German 
‘nationalism’ has arisen.’’171 Some viewed, and still view, Western democracy 
and the unmistakable economic disparity between Easterners and 
Westerners as an ‘‘occupation.’’172 East Germans were inundated by the 
communist mindset for so long that they naturally mistrusted the western 
way of life and government. For example, citizens of two eastern states 
thwarted a vote to unite them, mainly because of their mistrust for the 
government and frustration over the reunification.173 Citizens cited their 
general mistrust of the democratic system as their reason for opposing the 
unification.174 They expressed intense frustration toward West German 
leaders who made promises of equality between the two groups and failed to 
keep those promises. East Germans felt discouraged as a result of the political 
and economic division gaping between them and their Western counterparts. 
The East German cynicism towards the West German system of 
government resembled the legitimacy crises in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Hungary.175 East Germans perceived the role of their party, the policies of 
their party, and possibly the Communist Party itself as illegitimate.176 The 
                                                                                                                                      
 167. Kamali, supra note 163, at 109. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Stack, supra note 16, at 1250. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1213 (quoting Dan Van Der Vat, FREEDOM WAS NEVER LIKE THIS, 9 (1991)). East 
and West Germans hold deep prejudices against each other. East Germans ‘‘tend to see 
westerners as exploiters, and [westerners] . . . regard the east as an unworthy sinkhole for their 
tax money.’’ Id. at 1250 (quoting Alan Cowell, Kohl is an Iron Man, But the Price is High, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES (1996)). 
 173. Id. at 1229-1290. 
 174. Id. at 1230. 
 175. See Travieso-Diaz & Bleisteiner, supra note 16, at 187-90. 
 176. See id. at 189.   
22 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1 
 
East Germans’ skepticism prevented them from embracing their rights to 
own private property and engage in civil politics under the new system. In 
spite of all the obstacles, the transition was an overall success.177 East 
Germany received freedom of speech, travel, and the right to own property.178 
The entire nation experienced an economic boom.179 The United States was 
supportive of the reunification.180 Former Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice stated, ‘‘The United States----and President George H.W. Bush---- 
recognized that Germany had gone through a long democratic 
transition. . . . Any issues that had existed in 1945, it seemed perfectly 
reasonable to lay them to rest.’’181 While the president did not make a public 
statement, he ‘‘never tried in any way to prevent German unification.’’182 
Many years have passed since German reunification, and ample discussion 
has occurred on the subject. These discussions allow current and future 
leaders to analyze the success and failure of the German experience in order 
to prepare for a smooth transition. While the Helms-Burton Act was 
proposed to stop the communist agenda and support the Cuban nationals’ 
quest for freedom, the sanctions have not eliminated communism. Rather, 
these sanctions have worsened the nationals’ plight. There are two significant 
problems still preventing Cuba from making a smooth transition into 
democracy: (1) Castro’s administration is still viable, and (2) the Helms-
Burton Act prevents Cuba from making any substantive progress. 
III. THE PROBLEM 
A. The Viability of Castro’s Administration  
Fidel understood the value of creating dissension, even within his own 
party. In order to ensure that his disastrous legacy continued, Fidel delegated 
his authority to a few of his most trusted followers.183 This action ‘‘resulted in 
the erosion of trust amongst Castro’s ‘inner circle.’’’184  
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[W]hile the Castro government attempts incessantly to portray a 
united and strong government, dissention grows in the upper 
echelons of the Castro government as Fidel Castro withdraws 
from the political scene----dissention ‘created and fueled by Fidel 
himself to prevent alliances [that could] threaten his rule.’185  
When Fidel was no longer physically able to lead the Island, his brother 
became the ‘‘equivalent of President for life.’’186 While some reports show that 
Raúl is redesigning the communist system, these changes have progressed at 
a sluggish pace.187 Many believe that true democracy will never be achieved 
in Cuba until Castro and the communistic ideology are permanently 
dethroned. 
B. The United States Responds: The Helms-Burton Act 
1. History of the Act 
The United States established the Helms-Burton Act in response to a 
tempestuous relationship that had developed between the burgeoning Cuban 
communists and the United States.188 The United States’ hostile response was 
precipitated by the casualties from the Bay of Pigs invasion, the alarming 
relationship between Cuba and Russia, and the ‘‘uncompensated 
nationalization of American property valued at 1.8 billion dollars.’’189 The 
expropriated property is currently valued at over seven billion dollars.190 In 
writing this Act, Congress relied on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and 
the Trading with the Enemy Act to articulate a remedy for restitution of 
confiscated property.191 Prior to the establishment of the Helms-Burton Act, 
the United States government enforced a number of economic embargos that 
were already in place from the Foreign Assistance Act.192 
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The Helms-Burton Act was introduced in 1995.193 The Clinton 
Administration rejected the bill, ‘‘until the February 24, 1996, shootdown of 
two unarmed U.S. civilian aircraft over international waters by Cuban 
military aircraft resulting in the death of four Cuban-Americans.’’194 As a 
result of the incident, the bill quickly passed through the House and the 
Senate and was signed by the President.195 The Helms-Burton Act ‘‘take[s] 
proactive steps to encourage an early end to the Castro regime’’ and a 
transition to a ‘‘democratic process.’’196  Title 1 of the Act ‘‘strengthens the 
U.S. embargo against Cuba and calls for the concomitant strengthening of 
international sanctions.’’197 
The Act proscribed all trade with Cuba. Not a single product, technology 
or service from the United States could be exported to Cuba either directly 
or through a third party.198 An exception is allowed only for informational 
materials and limited humanitarian goods.199 All goods and services of Cuban 
origin are prohibited from being imported into the United States either 
directly or through a third party.200 This prohibition impacts offshore 
transactions as well as every Cuban national who has a product to sell.201 
Vessels are banned from carrying goods or passengers to or from Cuba or 
even from ‘‘carrying goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has any 
interest’’ into a U.S. port.202 
Cuban nationals are forbidden from owning property or other assets in 
the United States.203 The United States blocks all ‘‘payments, transfers, 
withdrawals or other dealings’’ unless the Treasury Department approves 
it.204 Additionally, ‘‘travel by U.S. nationals to Cuba is severely restricted.’’205 
Until recently, the only groups that were allowed to travel were ‘‘official 
government travelers, journalists and persons visiting close relatives in 
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circumstances of extreme humanitarian need.’’206 ‘‘[H]umanitarian travelers 
and persons traveling in connection with specific purposes’’ were allowed to 
travel only if they acquired specific licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control.207  
The Act states that embargos will only be lifted if the government begins 
the process of democratization.208 The legislature intended to use this Act to 
protect national security interests of the United States. Lastly, this Act has 
language that protects United States citizens from ‘‘confiscation of and 
trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro government.’’209 The Helms-
Burton Act ‘‘affect[s] all U.S. citizens, permanent residents, persons and 
organizations physically located in the United States and branches and 
subsidiaries of U.S. organizations located throughout the world.’’210 Violators 
of this Act are held accountable and could be imprisoned or have to pay 
‘‘corporate and individual fines.’’211 
The international community’s reaction to this Act ‘‘was universal, 
immediate and unequivocally hostile.’’212 Canada and Mexico complained 
that the Act infringed upon the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
which guaranteed the free movement of business travelers between the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico.213 The European Union argued that the 
Act breached the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.214 The majority of Latin American countries filed protests against this 
Act.215 Spain and Portugal ‘‘rejected the Act and urged the United States to 
reconsider its enforcement.’’216 The United Nations adopted a resolution in 
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November of 1996 ‘‘calling upon the United States to end its economic 
embargo against Cuba.’’217 The Vatican also jumped into the conflict ‘‘by 
issuing a statement questioning the legality of the Act.’’218 
2. How the Helms-Burton Act Affected Cuba 
These embargos have had a profound effect on Cuba. For example, the 
survival of the Island hinges on the success of its sugar industry.219 
Approximately fifty percent of Cuba’s export earnings are derived from 
sugar.220 Banning the sugar trade drove Cuba’s economy into a steep 
depression, one that impacted the lives of every Cuban national.221 On top of 
the economic devastation, the embargos severely restricted communication 
between Americans and Cubans.222 Families that were ripped apart due to the 
communist takeover were restricted from visiting or even communicating 
with their loved ones.223  
The lack of communication with the outside world is one reason why the 
Island is at a standstill.224 Castro has taken advantage of this by lying to his 
people about Americans.225 As they are cut off from the entire outside world, 
the Cuban nationals have no other choice but to believe the Communist 
propaganda and forfeit any dreams of freedom.226 Instead of pressuring the 
Cuban government, the embargos have caused the Cuban people to suffer.227 
‘‘Increasingly, the Cuban embargo seems like an outdated way to punish Fidel 
Castro when in actuality, the Cuban people are being punished. Economic 
policy towards a country of 11 million people needs to be based on more than 
a personal vendetta against the Castro family.’’228 
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IV. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT IN THE  
UNITED STATES 
There are a number of legal implications as a result of the Act. Instead of 
providing remedies for the victims of the illegal expropriation, this Act places 
numerous restrictions on what the legal system can do. American 
jurisprudence struggles with the issue of whether Congress delegated 
jurisdiction to courts to rule on these issues.229 Cuban nationals and exiles are 
unable to obtain justice because American courts have refused to interpret 
Congress’s acts. Many of these cases have been dismissed out of the 
consternation of overstepping Congressional boundaries.230 ‘‘[C]ourts should 
avoid interpreting acts of Congress as violating international law . . . .’’231 The 
Helms-Burton Act limits courts from seeking justice for the Cuban 
Americans who are victims of Castro’s expropriation and prevents them 
from obtaining remedies. 
V. THE SOLUTION 
The ultimate Cuban dream is to create a democratic state purged of radical 
tenets and welcoming reunification between the nationals and exiles. While 
Cuba’s story is distinct from the German experience, it is prudent to analyze 
the German democratization process and apply the principles that were 
successful while preparing to overcome the ideas that failed. Germans faced 
various challenges as a result of the reunification. Some of these included the 
partition between the western and eastern people and the masses and the 
elites. Moreover, the pace of the transition and the information provided to 
the East Germans caused a general feeling of distrust and skepticism towards 
the new government.232   
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A. The Challenges Faced When Uniting Two Groups who are Culturally 
Similar but Have Irreconcilable Experiences 
1. Germany Reunified: West and East Germans 
West Germans were perceived as a ‘‘wealthy class of individuals who . . . 
c[a]me in and took all the best properties through their property claims and 
demand[ed] restitution.’’233 In fact, in the 1990s, ‘‘only 21 percent of 
Easterners believe[d] the slogan ‘We are one people’ to be true. Instead, 
seventy percent [were] of the opinion that they [were] treated as ‘second-class 
Germans.’’’234 ‘‘Westerners dominate[d] within the parties, the ministries, the 
courts, the bureaucracies and in the interest groups.’’235 Thus, it was not 
surprising that communist groups resurfaced in eastern zones. During the 
time when the reunified government implemented privatization and 
restitution, the unrest was infectious.  East Germans mistrusted their western 
brothers and endeavored to revert back to a communist society.236 
2. The Cuban Diaspora: Cuban Nationals and Cuban Exiles 
Initially, when Fidel Castro ‘‘liberated’’ the Island from absolute rule, 
Cubans followed his revolutionary notions. When Fidel launched his 
campaign against capitalism and began stealing freedoms, the Cuban people 
fought back. The government reacted harshly towards the insurgents. Some 
were imprisoned, some were executed, and many others escaped to 
neighboring nations.237 Nearly one million exiles escaped from Cuba and a 
diaspora transpired.238 Cuban exiles escaped for many of the same reasons 
East Germans escaped to the west side of the Berlin Wall. As a percentage of 
population, however, more Cubans escaped from Cuba than Germans 
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escaped from East Germany.239 The majority of Cuban exiles are anti-Castro, 
while the average Cuban national ‘‘remains surprisingly loyal to the 
Revolution.’’240 In fact, it is the result of the anti-Castro inclination that, until 
recently, persuaded the United States policies against Cuba.241 Unlike exiles 
in Germany, ‘‘the Cuban-American community has assimilated less than 
many other . . . exile groups . . . .’’242  
In the same way that the East Germans perceived the West Germans as 
threatening towards their lifestyle, the Cuban nationals feel threatened by the 
Cuban exile community.243 Notwithstanding the fact that both Cuban exiles 
and nationals desire their island to revert back to a free society, there exists a 
great deal of friction.244 Cuban exiles possess a ‘‘position of strength and 
bargaining power’’ that nationals do not possess.245 Exile communities are 
wealthier and more affluent compared to their national brothers.246 Even in 
Cuba, the majority of individuals who escaped the island already had the 
necessary financial resources.247 At the time of Castro’s rise to power, racism 
was a constant problem.248 As evidence, the wealthy and affluent exiles are 
predominantly Caucasian, while the nationals, still on the Island, are chiefly 
from ‘‘African or mixed ancestry.’’249 Any remaining Cuban nationals with 
influence are those in the Communist Party. Since the diaspora, the 
economic gap between the exiles and the nationals has grown.250 Exiles living 
in the United States have worked diligently and experienced considerable 
success.251 Meanwhile, the individuals living on the Island have lost hope of 
ever seeing the fruits of their labor.252   
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In addition to the racial tension and inequalities, there exists a 
psychological divide between the exile and national communities. Similar to 
the divide between Eastern and Western Germans, Cuban exiles view the 
nationals’ loyalty to Castro as treasonous.253 Conversely, Cuban nationals feel 
apprehensive and suspicious about the exile community.254 The Cuban 
government has taken advantage of the public’s anxiety. In a radio broadcast 
to the Island, Castro warned the Cuban people that, ‘‘in Miami, they are 
already parceling out our country, and dreaming of getting everything back, 
but that won’t happen as long as there remains one single man or woman 
with a sense of dignity.’’255 The nationals fear the idea of the exiles returning 
and prioritizing their interests to the detriment of their countrymen’s 
interests. Even though transition has not yet occurred, the nationals already 
feel entrapped and harbor distrust towards the exiles and the American way 
of life.256 Such feelings of distrust are strikingly similar to what the Eastern 
Germans felt towards the West Germans. 
3. Understanding the Roles and Relationship Between the Cuban 
Masses and the Cuban Elites 
Transition is impacted by the strength of the people, both the masses and 
the elites.257 Nations that have successfully transitioned from one type of 
government to another have faced issues involving both mass mobilization 
and political elites.258 Both groups have a direct impact on the constitutional 
drafting and implementation processes. Understanding the roles and 
relationships between these groups is crucial to a successful transition. ‘‘The 
masses serve as the spark for a transition. . . . [R]evolutions result where the 
masses can trigger a transition through the use of force.’’259 Elites also play a 
significant role in a governmental transition. ‘‘[E]lite consent for this 
particular form of political change is absolutely necessary and, in some 
instances, sufficient for the long-term success of democracy.’’260 Any 
transition Cuba makes from Communism toward Democracy ‘‘will likely 
arise when the [elite] members . . . see a free market democracy as a valid and 
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advantageous alternative to their current situation.’’261 Constitutional politics 
‘‘are influenced . . . by constraints and opportunities facing political elites, the 
level of popular mobilization, and ‘regional contagion’ effects.’’262 This was 
true in Germany as well. ‘‘After the fall of the communist regime in East 
Germany, there were few viable alternatives and the voluntary election by 
East Germans to join [West] Germany legitimated the incorporation 
process.’’263 Some historians argue that the negative experience East Germans 
had with democratization came as a result of the accelerated speed of the 
transition.264   
Communism naturally prompts a contrasting divide between the rich and 
the poor.  As a result of restricted contact with Cuban nationals, little is 
known regarding the specific relationship amongst the classes inside of 
Cuba.265 What is clear, however, is that Communism creates a sharp line 
between those with privileges and those without hope. The average Cuban 
national faces a permanent glass ceiling because they are restricted from any 
opportunities to better themselves.266 ‘‘[M]any people who otherwise would 
do higher learning instead spend that energy leaving the country.’’267 The 
intense situation present on the Island ‘‘may produce a reaction within Cuba 
for change.’’268 Cuba’s civil society is currently weak because it has been a 
‘‘hermetically sealed society’’ for the last fifty years.269 Arguably,  
[w]hile the masses may play a role in provoking or exacerbating a 
crisis of legitimacy on the island, they are not as likely to play as 
important a role as members of the elite in dismantling of the 
current regime----primarily because of the general weakness of 
civil society in Cuba.270  
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The elites owe their position to their relationship with Castro’s 
administration.271 Even if they desire a democratic nation, the elites fear they 
would risk everything by speaking against the regime.272 Nevertheless, if any 
permanent change were to occur on the Island, it would have to be as a result 
of changes implemented by the wealthy elites and supported by mass 
mobilization.    
B. Choosing the Best Speed for the Transition and the Most Effective 
Remedy for Restitution is Critical for a Successful Transition  
Analysts scrutinize history to understand the process by which a nation 
transitions from one form of government to another. Often, nations in the 
process of transitioning eliminate one extreme ideology only to implement 
its rival.273 These transitions may be characterized, scrutinized, and 
formulized by a variety of methods. The speed of the transition and the type 
of remedy the government offers injured parties plays a crucial role in 
preparing for a smooth transition. 
1. The Speed for the Transition 
Privatization is the process by which property, formerly nationalized, is 
returned to the people. The speed by which the government chooses to 
transition both directly and indirectly affects its success. Historically, nations 
have employed a variety of timetables. A government may implement 
privatization gradually or rapidly.274 A progressive transition is known as a 
‘‘gradualist process’’ and its antithesis, which occurs rapidly, has been 
referred to as ‘‘shock therapy.’’275  
a. The Gradualist Process 
Gradual privatization is often used ‘‘in countries that seek to retain a 
centrally planned economic system.’’276 The purpose of this method is to 
slowly implement a full transformation.277 A gradualist method allows a new 
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economy to be paralleled with the old.278 ‘‘[A] ‘gradualist’ approach to 
privatization is the only feasible solution as it allows the development of a 
market economy that incorporates the socio-cultural and socio-
psychological order of the country.’’279 ‘‘Asset values should be permitted to 
reflect the declining political risk and improving business climate before 
these companies are sold.’’280 Under a gradual transition, Cubans will have 
the opportunity to reap the value of their property to avoid ‘‘seeing them 
squandered in hard currency sales to foreign speculators.’’281  
Supporters of a gradual method recognize the need for actual owners who 
have a ‘‘long term view’’ as this encourages a ‘‘strong measure of control.’’282 
Gradualists fear that a rapid transition would cause ‘‘danger of severe 
economic dislocation if too much change is attempted quickly.’’283 
Additionally, some scholars, such as prominent exile Antonio Jorge, argue 
that a gradualist transition is preferred to avoid the political and social 
tensions that accompany a quick transition.284  
b. Shock Therapy  
The antithetical approach to a slow and gradual change is rapid reform.285 
Ideally, shock therapy would involve a ‘‘full range of reforms including: 
macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization, currency convertibility, 
trade and banking reformation, labor deregulation, privatization, and legal 
and social reformation, [enacted] simultaneously and as quickly as 
possible.’’286 Proponents of a gradual process argue that the historical 
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repercussions of rapid transition has often produced ‘‘mass public opposition 
and dissonance amongst the elite, complicating economic transition even 
more and possibly delaying further needed reforms.’’287 
Rapid transitions, however, are best used during a ‘‘period of 
extraordinary politics.’’288 Leaders utilize shock therapy to ensure that ‘‘the 
public is more willing to make personal sacrifices for the greater good . . . .’’289 
Examples of scenarios involving ‘‘extraordinary politics’’ include the end of 
foreign control or the beginning of a democratic system. The merger of East 
and West Germany was what some analysts describe as a successful example 
of shock therapy. ‘‘German leaders seized the opportunity created by the fall 
of Communism to make extraordinary changes, and the two Germanies were 
politically and economically unified in one swift motion.’’290 Both sovereigns 
signed the Treaty of Unification, which infused the democratic political 
processes of the west into the east zones.  An additional treaty was set in place 
to launch a marriage of economies.291 A market economy was created that 
‘‘operate[d] on principles of private ownership and competition driven by 
free pricing and the free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services.’’292 
These treaties also allowed for the unifying of the currency.293  
Nevertheless, the dislocation that occurs when property is privatized 
before a market exists and before a stable process is established is inherently 
dangerous and sometimes fatal to a fledgling country.294  The treaties both 
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Germanies signed caused a shock to the economy.295 In order for that 
government to fulfill its goal of privatizing quickly, it ‘‘disassembled many 
enterprises and cut out the overemployment typical of the communist 
system, which led to high unemployment rates and disenchantment with the 
new market system.’’296 Jobs were drastically cut and East Germans had 
almost no ownership in the newly privatized enterprises.297   
Likewise, the East Germans were not prepared for the shock of a new 
economic system. As one observer noted, the ‘‘morale and attitudes of the 
[East German] people are almost beyond repair.’’298 Some critics maintain 
that the ‘‘the psychological scars displayed by the East Germans are so deep . 
. . that they have put the east into a worse position----for all its newfound 
economic potential----than Eastern Europe’s other former Communist 
states.’’299 Thus far, shock therapy in European nations has proven to 
‘‘exacerbate[] the dislocations inherent in the transformation process.’’300 If 
not done correctly, rapid transitions can generate instability and mistrust 
between a citizenry and its vulnerable government.301 
2. The Spectrum of Remedial Possibilities 
Former socialistic and communistic nations have taken measures to 
restore property expropriated by the state. Legislators recognize that their 
ultimate goal in enforcing restitution is to ensure that ‘‘establishing historical 
juridical justice will [not] beget new injustice.’’302 ‘‘Restitution [of property] is 
‘the natural law’ and should be the general rule with respect to previous 
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confiscation of private property.’’303 A number of these nations experimented 
with various forms of privatization, thus producing a spectrum of 
possibilities for restitution.304 Natural restitution and monetary 
compensation are the most effective remedies.305 
a. Natural Restitution  
The concept of privatization is the process by which property, illegally 
expropriated by the state, is reverted back into private hands.306 Some analysts 
view the process of privatization as a natural result of a nation attempting to 
move past its communistic roots.307 One of the goals of privatization is ‘‘the 
equitable redistribution of property rights.’’308 Stripping property out of the 
hands of a small group of elites and transferring it back to the public can 
arguably assist a transitional government in breaking its ties to the former 
government.309 Natural restitution is a term that ‘‘refers to [the] return of the 
actual property expropriated during the communist era.’’310  
Historians and analysts supporting restitution of property have found 
three rationales for natural restitution. First, restitution promotes rapid and 
efficient transition to a market economy by transferring state and collective 
property to private owners.311 Simultaneously, restitution ‘‘‘restor[es] the 
value of property’ in the minds of citizens.’’312 Second, analysts argue that 
restitution ‘‘is ‘morally the right thing to do’ to remedy past [wrongs].’’313 
Third, restitution ‘‘serves ‘as a vehicle for the construction of post-
communist national identity.’’’314 
However, the sovereigns that deployed a mass privatization, which 
involved natural restitution, faced concerns that these actions ‘‘would 
interfere with the country’s advanced privatization process, jeopardize 
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foreign investment, and increase the foreign debt which was already the 
highest in the region.’’315 The two German governments opted to restore 
stolen property to its former owners.316 East Germany’s experience with 
natural restitution demonstrated the difficulty of transitioning property 
rights from state controlled to a privatized system.317 
The Marxist philosophy that dominated East Germany held that ‘‘private 
ownership of the means of production, including property, is the primary 
means of oppression.’’318 This ideology derived from the Communist 
Manifesto, in which Karl Marx wrote, ‘‘[Communism] may be summed up 
in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.’’319 East Germans were 
responsible for the property they lived on and farms they operated.320 Yet, 
these responsibilities did not constitute legal property ownership.321  
In reunited Germany, privatization took the form of sale of property and 
restitution of expropriated property.322 The first step Germany took was to 
create a Trust Agency that assumed ownership of all state-owned enterprises 
and then privatized them by sale to investors.323 This idea proved to be 
difficult and slow as claims poured in and overwhelmed the Agency. ‘‘[I]n 
many instances, the law favored a current property holder over a restitution 
claimant.’’324 This, along with the fact that most East Germans lacked 
ownership,325 caused an unbelievable number of complications,326 thus 
resulting in East Germans’ frustration and mistrust of the democratic 
government.327 ‘‘East Germans . . . reacted to privatization with feelings of 
disbelief and betrayal. Many East Germans believed that the [Trust Agency] 
sold off property as quickly as it could, paying little attention to the effect it 
would have on life in East Germany.’’328 
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b. Monetary Compensation  
Compensation is yet another method to provide a remedy to jilted 
property owners. Many European restitution systems ‘‘guarantee 
‘compensation’ to former owners who decline other forms of restitution 
and/or are ineligible to receive natural restitution.’’329 In cases where 
restitution is not available, ‘‘where current holders of the property are exempt 
from claims under the laws . . . or where the property serves exempted public 
purposes,’’ compensation becomes the remedy of choice.330 
In cases that required monetary compensation, the state paid ‘‘a lump sum 
to itself based on some percentage of the overall estimated total value of the 
claims, and then pa[id them] out in the form of benefits to its citizen 
claimants.’’331 ‘‘[C]ompensation strategies are usually far easier to expedite 
than is restitution and can take into account the political interests of a 
transitional regime in avoiding alienating populations fearful of losing their 
homes or jobs.’’332 In Germany, the Trust Agency first attempted to provide 
in-kind compensation. However, when approximately 1.2 million claims 
were filed, compensation was seen as too expensive.333 Germany continued 
to use it ‘‘in the case[s] of good faith purchasers, property used for residential 
purposes that [were] currently occupied, property dedicated to the public 
interest, and property involving a joint commercial enterprise.’’334 
In Cuba’s case, a pure monetary compensation strategy may not be the 
most effective remedy. ‘‘Domestically, the Cuban treasury is drained, the 
resources of the citizens are nominal, and the government is on the verge of 
bankruptcy.’’335 ‘‘A transitional government in Havana . . . is not liable to have 
access to adequate financial resources to pay compensation.’’336 Thus, unless 
the Island’s economy drastically improves, compensation cannot be the 
primary remedy for expropriated property. 
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Natural restitution may be the Island’s remedy of choice, as it allows for a 
decisive break from the previous regime, while compensation does not. 337 
Compensation strategies are likely to be more costly than natural 
restitution.338 Natural restitution establishes the priority and validity of 
property rights and provides a clear title for owners while compensation 
opens the question of who eventually gain control of the contested 
property.339 Generally, compensation340 is paid at a small percentage of any 
value that might be placed on the property, while natural restitution tends to 
stimulate markets, thus affecting higher economic efficiency.341 Since both 
strategies pose problems, a balanced combination of the two strategies might 
be the best solution.342 At the very least, ‘‘restitution should be the rule and 
compensation should be the exception.’’343 
3. Cuba’s Best Choice 
Fidel Castro’s administration took every opportunity to expropriate 
property from innocent Cubans. The three main justifications for these illegal 
actions were as follows:  
(1) Expropriation of . . . land, industries, and businesses for 
economic reform purposes; (2) confiscation of property from 
alleged . . . individuals and corporate entities found ‘‘liable for 
offenses against the national economy or public treasury;’’ and (3) 
seizure of property ‘‘voluntarily’’ ‘‘abandoned’’ by Cuban citizens 
who travelled abroad and failed to return within a specified time 
period.344 
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‘‘With the rapid deterioration of the Cuban economy and rising 
international concern, resolution of this issue has become a matter of great 
urgency.’’345 Economic analysts argue that it is in Cuba’s best interest to enact 
‘‘a rapid macroeconomic change to a market economy.’’346 This system, while 
needed to ensure restitution to or compensation of former owners, must also 
encourage long-term investment commitments.347 Such an environment 
would prevent capital depletion or a destabilization of economic markets.348 
Thus, shock therapy is the best choice for speed.  
As for a remedy, restitution of Cuban property is not only the most 
effective remedy, but also has powerful symbolic value, as it would mark the 
rise of a new era.349 Such a symbol ‘‘would provide a moral as well as legal 
condemnation of the past’’ and thus ‘‘establish legitimacy in the eyes of the 
world community.’’350 An added benefit to a natural restitution process is that 
it has the potential to accelerate the restoration of ties between Cuba and the 
United States.351    
C. The United States’ Role in Cuba’s Tomorrow 
The first question to address is whether the United States should get 
involved in the Cuban situation. The answer to this question would be more 
complex if the United States wasn’t already involved. However, the United 
States has already intervened in Cuban affairs by enacting embargos with the 
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romantic hopes that the Communist Party would surrender. This fantasy has 
had a harrowing effect on Cuban nationals, who have suffered for over fifty 
years. Historically, embargos have caused more harm than actual progress 
towards freedom.352 Due to the United States’ history of imposing embargos, 
the United States has the responsibility to make some changes in its policy 
that would further the interests of the Cuban people. 
Obtaining freedom for Cubans while retaining the trust of nationals is a 
delicate but crucial process. Exiles need the opportunity to express their 
ideology and nationals need the opportunity to hear and understand their 
Cuban brothers. In order to do this, the United States must lift the embargos 
that limit communication and travel on both sides, thus allowing 
information to reach Cuban nationals. Permitting exiles to build 
relationships with nationals will prevent the difficult situation that occurred 
in Germany, and allow for a smoother transition. Additionally, authorizing 
importation of technology will aid nationals in their quest to understand the 
dangers of communism and the benefits of democracy.  
In April 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced his plan to ease 
restrictions on travel and remittances to the Island by Cuban-Americans, but 
the U.S. trade embargo remains.353 In the official White House 
Memorandum, the President recognized that promoting communication 
between Cuban-Americans and their relatives, as well as ‘‘increasing the flow 
of remittances and information’’ is vital to ‘‘decrease dependency of the 
Cuban people on the Castro regime . . . .’’354 The President’s order authorized 
and licensed U.S. telecommunication service providers, as well as satellite, 
radio, and television service providers, to link with and engage in 
transactions in Cuba.355 The order authorized the export of ‘‘mobile phone 
systems, computers and software, and satellite receivers’’ to Cuba.356 
Additionally, the ban on humanitarian exports was removed. The order 
allowed for donations of ‘‘clothing, personal hygiene items, seeds, veterinary 
medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making 
equipment’’ for humanitarian needs.357  
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The President’s executive order triggered a debate as to whether he 
overstepped his authority by avoiding the Act’s restrictions.358 No one expects 
Raúl or any Cuban leader to swiftly transition from one style of government 
to another. President Obama is simply responding to Raúl’s gradual policy 
changes.359 The executive order combined with Raúl’s decision to allow more 
access to the internet enables Cubans to communicate with the outside world 
and receive necessary humanitarian aid. The opportunity to obtain 
information is the first step in completely transforming the Cuban way of life.  
On December 17, 2014, President Obama and his administration released 
a proposal creating a new plan for Cuba.360 Thus began the first conversation 
between the leaders of the United States and Cuba since the 1959 Cuban 
Revolution.361 The Obama administration described the decision by stating 
that ‘‘President Obama is taking action to cut loose the anchor of failed 
policies of the past, and to chart a new course in U.S. relations with Cuba that 
will engage and empower the Cuban people.’’362 In response, ‘‘President Raúl 
Castro . . . thank[ed] President Obama for ‘a new chapter’ while also 
reaffirming that restored relations with the United States did not mean the 
end of communist rule in Cuba.’’363 The gradual implementation of these 
changes, if done correctly, can empower the Cuban nationals to fight for their 
freedom. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Change is inevitable for Cuba. The United States should support Cuba as 
it did Germany. The United States supported the German reunification as 
well as the democratization of Eastern Germany even though the United 
States did not take an active role in Germany’s democratization. Unlike the 
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passive role the United States took with Germany, the United States chose to 
take an active role by sanctioning Cuba’s communist regime. The sanctions 
the United States imposed have harmed nationals, rather than protected.  For 
this reason, the United States has a duty to change course. If done properly, 
President Obama’s decision to restore relations may provide nationals with 
the support they need to overturn the communist regime. While these 
changes are exciting, the United States must carefully weigh the possibility 
that this newfound relationship may further solidify Castro’s communism, 
and thus further hurt the Cuban people. 
When Cuba embarks on its transition from communism to a free society, 
its leaders must show their commitment to legitimize the government and to 
protect private property rights. This commitment can manifest itself in the 
form of privatization and remedies for individuals and corporations with 
expropriated property. Privatization is a tricky process and success can only 
be achieved when ‘‘people accept, understand, and participate in the resulting 
market economy and where political stability thereby remains.’’364  
Germany had the ideal situation; the governmental system did not need to 
be recreated. The two nations simply merged and implemented the already-
established Western structure. Despite these ideal circumstances, 
transformation in Germany was arduous. A more gradual process, with 
Western Germans educating East Germans, would have provided East 
Germans with a smoother transition. Unlike the East Germans’ experience, 
Cuban nationals will have to construct a Cuban democratic system from the 
ground up. Democratizing gradually would provide Cuban nationals time to 
adjust, allow the economy to develop, as well as incorporate the socio-
cultural and socio-psychological aspects of the Island.365  
Regarding a remedy, natural restitution is the best choice for resolving 
claims of property expropriation. The Cuban administration, responsible for 
prioritizing claims, should emphasize claims from nationals rather than 
those of exiles. If factors exist that impede natural restitution, then 
appropriate authorities should be given the jurisdiction to turn to other 
remedies. These remedies would consist of either allocating other properties 
to serve as a substitute for restitution or monetary compensation. 
Cuba’s future is in the hands of Cuban nationals, exiles, and the United 
States government. Although predicting the Island’s fate is impossible, it is 
possible to appreciate that all Cubans desire peace and prosperity for their 
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home. Ultimately, ‘‘the strength of the human spirit and the character of the 
Cuban people’’ will determine Cuba’s future.366 
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